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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 08-2504
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CHESNEY JONES,
Appellant
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No.) 07-cr–0208-1
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on March 23, 2010
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed March 30, 2010)
__________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Chesney Jones appeals from a jury verdict finding her guilty of: unlawful
possession and distribution of at least 50 grams of crack cocaine, and at least 5 kilograms
of cocaine hydrochloride; interstate travel in aid of racketeering; making false statements;
and conspiracy to distribute drugs. Jones was sentenced to a total of 25 years’
imprisonment. Jones contends that the District Court erred by admitting into evidence
recordings of conversations in violation of the Confrontation Clause, admitting text
messages into evidence without allowing Jones to examine the phone on which these
messages were stored, and giving an improper jury instruction regarding Jones’
testimony. We write only for the parties and assume their familiarity with the factual and
procedural history of this case. We will affirm.
After her arrest for a parole violation, Jones asked to speak to Drug Enforcement
Agents and admitted that she was a drug “runner” and had supplied multiple shipments of
cocaine hydrochloride to a buyer, Lance Harper, for approximately one year. Jones
agreed to cooperate with law enforcement and made recorded phone calls to Harper and
other individuals involved in drug trafficking. During one recorded meeting with Harper,
Jones attempted to tip him off that she was cooperating with law enforcement. Jones
testified at her trial, retracted everything she had told agents, and denied being involved
with drug trafficking.
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I. Recordings
Jones contends that consensually recorded conversations between herself and her
alleged co-conspirators should not have been admitted into evidence because they are
testimonial and therefore violate the Confrontation Clause, according to Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). In Crawford, the Supreme Court held that out-of-court
statements that are testimonial are barred by the Confrontation Clause unless the witness
is unavailable and the defendant had a previous opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
541 U.S. at 68. However, we have held that “‘party admissions and co-conspirator
portions’ of disputed tape recordings are ‘nontestimonial.’” United States v. Bobb, 471
F.3d 491, 499 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 183-84
(3d Cir. 2005)). The Confrontation Clause does not bar the admission of nontestimonial
statements if they are “subject to a firmly rooted hearsay exception.” Albrecht v. Horn,
485 F.3d 103, 134 (3d Cir. 2007). Therefore, admitting the recorded conversations of
Jones and her co-conspirators into evidence did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
Jones next argues that the conversations were hearsay and the District Court erred
in admitting the conversations under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). Under Rule
801(d)(2)(E), out of court statements by a co-conspirator are admissible if the
preponderance of the evidence shows that (1) a conspiracy existed; (2) that the defendant
and the declarant were members of the conspiracy; and (3) the statement was made in
furtherance of and in the course of the conspiracy. Bobb, 471 F.3d at 498. Jones urges
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that because the recordings were made after she was arrested and while she was
cooperating with law enforcement, they cannot be in furtherance of or during the course
of a conspiracy because the conspiracy had ended. However, the government provided
evidence that during Jones’ conversations with Harper she attempted to warn him that
they were being recorded - therefore, the conspiracy had not ended and the statements
were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. The District Court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing the recorded statements to be admitted into evidence.

II. Text Messages
Jones next contends that the District Court erred by admitting text messages found
on her cell phone but not allowing Jones to personally examine the phone during trial.
While the government was presenting its case at trial, Jones asked if she could examine
her cell phone to attempt to prove that text messages to Harper were created after she was
in custody and therefore must have been planted by government agents. Jones’ counsel
had previously been given access to the phone and had seen the text messages at issue.
A. 225-29. The government objected to Jones handling the phone because of “grave
concerns about placing a valuable piece of evidence into the hands of the defendant to
personally manipulate this.” Id. Instead, the government offered to send the phone to a
laboratory where an expert could examine it to determine when the text messages were
written. Id.
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On appeal, Jones urges that the government’s refusal to allow her to personally
examine the phone during the trial is a Brady violation. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), requires that prosecutors disclose potentially exculpatory evidence to the defense.
Here, where prosecutors allowed Jones’ counsel to access the phone and view the text
messages, and, when Jones asked to handle the phone during the trial, offered to have the
phone examined by an expert, there was no Brady violation.
III. Jury Instruction
Lastly, Jones claims that the District Court erred in giving a jury instruction that
unfairly singled out Jones’ testimony as potentially biased. The District Court instructed
the jury that:
the defendant, Chesney Jones, has taken the witness stand.
You should examine and evaluate her testimony just as you
would the testimony of any witness. It is for you to decide to
what extent, if at all, Ms. Jones’s interest in the result of her
prosecution may have affected or colored her testimony.
A. 353.
In the District Court’s general charge regarding witness credibility, it said “[t]he
parties themselves, that is the government and the defendant, have an obvious interest [in
the outcome of the case].” A. 352. Therefore, it was unnecessary for the Court to
reiterate that Jones’ had a personal interest in the outcome of case in a separate
instruction. While such an instruction that singles out the defendant’s interest in the case
is not advisable, we find that here it did not constitute reversible error.
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In Reagan v. United States,157 U.S. 301, 304-05 (1895), the Supreme Court approved
the following instruction:
You should especially look to the interest which the respective
witnesses have in the suit, or in its result. Where the witness has
a direct personal interest in the result of the suit, the temptation
is strong to color, pervert, or withhold the facts. The law permits
the defendant, at his own request, to testify in his own behalf.
The defendant here has availed himself of this privilege. His
testimony is before you, and you must determine how far it is
credible. The deep personal interest which he may have in the
result of the suit should be considered by the jury in weighing
his evidence, and in determining how far, or to what extent, if at
all, it is worthy of credit.
In Reagan, the Court held that a trial court may instruct the jury that they may
consider the defendant’s “deep personal interest” in the outcome of the case, but cannot
declare or imply that the defendant has testified falsely. 157 U.S. at 311. The instruction
here did not imply that Jones had testified falsely and therefore is not reversible error
under Reagan.1
For the foregoing reasons we will AFFIRM Jones’ convictions and
sentence.
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We note that several courts of appeals have expressed concern as to the use of
instructions that single out the defendant’s interest in the case even though they don’t
constitute reversible error. See United States v. Gaines, 457 F.3d 238, 245 (2d Cir. 2006);
United States v. Bear Killer, 534 F.2d 1253, 1259-60 (8th Cir. 1976);United States v.
Saletko, 452 F.2d 193, 198-99 (7th Cir. 1971).
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